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Textualist Canons:
Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools
STEPHEN M. DURDEN*

INTRODUCTION

Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the "dead" Constitution.' Justice
Brennan honors the "living" Constitution.2 Others believe in "a partially
living and partially dead Constitution."' But, whichever moniker selected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal;
however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular
(i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal
means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an interpreter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using
any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even
inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method.

*

Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I can never thank my family
and friends enough.
1. See generally Sanford Levinson, Our Schizoid Approach to the United States Constitution: Competing Narrative of Constitutional Dynamism and Stasis, 84 IND. L.J. 1337,
1346 (2009) (describing Antonin Scalia as "the proud devotee of a 'dead' Constitution");
Reva B. Siegel, Heller and Originalism's Dead Hand-In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L.
REv 1399, 1408 (noting that in "many speeches" Justice Scalia has called for a "dead constitution"); Roy L. Brooks, Toward a Post-Atonement America: The Supreme Court's Atonement for Slavery and Jim Crow, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 739, 747 (2009) (describing Justice
Scalia's "dead constitution"); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 693 (1976) (discussing a "dead" Constitution nearly 35 years ago).
2. See generallyJames L. Buckley, The Constitution and the Courts: A Question of Legitimacy, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 199 (2000) (recognizing the sophisticated arguments in support of Justice Brennan's "living" Constitution); Bernard Schwartz, "Brennan vs. Rehnquist"- Mirror Images in ConstitutionalConstruction, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
213, 239 (1994) (discussing the interpretational approaches used by Brennan and Rehnquist); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 263
(2009) (describing Justice Brennan as "a leading proponent of the theory of the living
constitution").
3. See generally Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 555, 559 (2006) (discussing the author's opinion that "we have a
partially living and partially dead Constitution").
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This Article uses canons of construction to demonstrate that textualism,4 particularly plain language or plain meaning textualism,' cannot be applied without the use of non-textual personal choices. But, this
Article does not seek to demonstrate that interpreting the Constitution
requires ignoring the text of the Constitution; nor does this Article seek
to demonstrate that textualist approaches lack relevance or value. Rather, this Article seeks to demonstrate that textualism cannot create rules
that avoid personal predilections' and does not create neutral principles7
or eliminate predilective interpretation.8 In order to accomplish this

4. See generally Stephen M. Durden, Animal Farm Jurisprudence: Hiding Personal
Predilections Behind the "PlainLanguage" of the Takings Clause, 25 PACE ENvTL. L. REV 355
(2008) (discussing the failures of textualism based on plain meaning).
5. See generally Stephen M. Durden, Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 337 (2008) (discussing the
use and meaning of plain language or plain meaning textualism).

6. See Durden, supra note 4; Durden, supra note 5; see also Larry Cata' Backer,
From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power
Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 710 (2009) (arguing that constitutionalism seeks to
"avoid judicial despotism by forcing judicial discourse to privilege forms of analysis that
reduce the ability of judges to substitute their personal predilections for that of the
community"); Tom Levinson, Confrontation, Fidelity, Transformation: The "Fundamentalist"Judicial Persona ofJustice Antonin Scalia, 26 PACE L. REv. 445, 470 (2006) (discussing
Justice Scalia's view that a judge's duty requires textualism, or at least some form of textualism, in order to "avoid importing [the judge's] own personal predilections into the
text").
7. But see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 264 (2009) (declaring, without discussion, that textualism is a
neutral principle); William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning and the Case of Amar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 494
(2007) ("Modem textualists embrace an approach that, at its core, involves a popularly
enacted document (the Constitution) using a methodology that reflects neutral principles (the principles of close-reading textualism) rather than the constitutional ideology
of the interpreter."); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom and Prosperity, 10 SuP.
CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2003) ("T[he] core and traditional definition of the rule of law contains three basic values or concepts: (1) constitutionalism; (2) rule-based decisionmaking; and (3) a commitment to neutral principles, such as federalism, separation of
powers, and textualism.").
8. See Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court's Endorsement of a PoliticizedJudiciary: A Philosophic Critique, 8 J L. Soc'Y 114, 124 (2007) (citing Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 863, 849-65 (1989)) (explaining that "textualism comes as
a solution to the danger of moral or ideological judicial decision-making"); Daniel S.
Goldberg, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means: How Kripke and Wittgenstein's Analysis on Rule Following Underminesjustice Scalia's Textualism and Originalism,54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 273, 274 n.4 (2006) ("The raison d'etre of textualism is judicial minimalism - to prevent judges from deciding cases according to their own predilections rather
than on the law.").

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss1/3

2

Durden: Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools

TEXTUALIST CANONS

2010]

117

goal, this Article reviews a variety of canons of construction and applies
them to the Takings Clause.'
II.

PLAIN MEANING OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

This Article assumes, for discussion purposes, that the Takings
Clause contains plain language,"o thereby limiting its reach to claims
arising from a government either taking possession of," or title to,' 2
property. Accordingly, this Article assumes that the plain language of
the Takings Clause precludes all claims not arising from the government
taking possession or title' 3 (i.e., regulatory takings claims). Ideally, this
9.
10.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Numerous commentators write about and suggest the existence of a "plain

meaning" to the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. 432, 443 n.74 (2005); Eric R. Claeys, Takings and
Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 187, 206, 221 (2004); Eric R.
Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1564,
1665 (2003); Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings
and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REv. 571, 588 (2003); Henry A. Span, Public Choice
Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REv. 11, 96, 102 n.373
(2003); Kenneth Salzberg, "Takings" as Due Process, or Due Process as "Takings"?, 36 VAL.
U. L. REV. 413, 420 n.42 (2002); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., ExpropriatoryIntent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 713, 771 n.245 (2002); John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails To Advance
a Legitimate Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853, 875
(1999).
11. See, e.g., Mark Tunick, Constitutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling
the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 897 (2001) ("There is
some evidence that until the end of the nineteenth century, courts regarded the Takings
Clause as protecting possession only, not value."); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1134
(2000) (explaining that early courts used "a conventional, plain meaning" to the Takings
Clause, limiting its application to government action that took "title or possession"); Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment,
148 U. PA. L. REv. 873, 881-82 (2000) ("The term 'take' most naturally refers to an actual
expropriation of property . . . .").
12. Hart, supra note 11, at 1134 (defining "appropriating private property" as "depriving the owner of title or possession" and noting that "[rleading the phrase 'property .
taken' to indicate appropriation was a conventional, plain meaning").
13. See, e.g., Tunick, supra note 11, at 893-94 ("The words of the Takings Clause
are clear: [the] government may not take--that is, confiscate, appropriate, seize, remove,
force one to relinquish or transfer title of--one's property, without providing just compensation. . . . The [Supreme] Court should limit the applicability of the Takings Clause
to appropriations, seizures, and confiscations . . . ."); William Michael Treanor, Takings
Law and the Regulatory State: A Response to R.S. Radford, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 453, 45758 (1995) (opining that the original understanding of the Takings Clause and its state
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interpretational method prevents judges from allowing their personal
predilections to control their interpretation of the Takings Clause.14
As noted, this Article applies a number of canons of constitutional
interpretation in the context of the plain meaning of the Takings Clause.
The canons chosen align with the ideals that plain language textualism
implicitly, or sometimes explicitly, seeks to embrace. Ultimately, this
review of interpretational canons aims to demonstrate that reliance on
these canons undercuts textualists' claims of greater objectivity."
III. TEXTUALIST CANONS

Constitutional interpreters often use tools known as canons of construction.1 These canons have been grouped or labeled as descriptive
canons, traditional canons," generic canons," linguistic canons,20 gen
counterparts is consistent with the clause's plain meaning). Dean Treanor argued that the
Takings Clause and similar state constitutional provisions were originally understood to
apply only when the government physically took property. Treanor, supra at 457-58.
Further, regulations, no matter how drastically they affected the price of property, did
not trigger a compensation requirement. Id.
14. Tunick, supra note 13, at 897 ("The words of the Takings Clause themselves offer no guidance for anyone averse to relying on the plain meaning of "do not take property" and wanting to invoke the legal conception of property as a "bundle of rights" in order to decide how many sticks in this bundle must be relinquished for a regulation to
amount to a taking."). See generally Durden, supra note 5.
15. One of the points this Article seeks to make is that textualists must necessarily
be selective in their use of canons of construction. But see Daniel K. Brough, Breaking
Down the Misprision Walls: Looking Back on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, After Booker, Through a Bloomian Lens, 82 N.D. L. REv. 413, 433 n.80 (2006) (suggesting that the
claim to objectivity is lost when textualists selectively use canons of constitutional construction).
16. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only
One Stop, 95 VA. L. REv. 597, 607 (2009) (referring to "tools of statutory construction,
such as canons of construction"); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Schevron's
Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 623 (2009) (recognizing that normative canons of construction are interpretive tools); Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman's March (In)to the Sea, 74
TENN. L. REV. 319, 362 (2007) (describing canons of construction as "traditional tools of
interpretation"); Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretationand Decision Theory: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation, Adrian Vermule, 74 U. Ci. L. REV. 329, 348-49
(2007) (characterizing descriptive canons as traditional tools of statutory construction).
17. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 16, at 349.
18. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 70, 89 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Nelson supra note 16, at 352.
20. See, e.g., Nicole M. Quallen, Damages Under the Privacy Act: Is Emotional Harm
"Actual"?, 88 N. C. L. REV. 334, 349 (2009); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Re-
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2
eral canons, 21 substantive canons,21223
language canons, normative canons, extrinsic source canons,2 and most importantly (at least for this
Article) textualist 26 or textual27 canons.
The number of such canons probably depends on who is counting
and who is defining. One set of authors identified thirteen textual ca29
28
ante
tcnn
nons, while another article identified at least six textual canons.

viewability: A Study in CanonicalConstruction and its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743,
749 (1992).
21. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, PracticeMakes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223, 230 (2008); Frederick
M. Rowe, Cost Justification of Price Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 59
CoLuM. L. REV. 584, 588 (1959).
22. See, e.g., Richard L. Hansen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74
(2009); William N. Eskeridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1011 (1989).
23. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Questfor Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 5 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 64 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation,98
Geo. L.J. 341, 352 (2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Forward:Law As
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 99 (1994).
26. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
'Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1101
(2001).
27. See, e.g., Anita Krishnakumar, The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The
Unique National Institution Canon, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1053, 1097 (2009).
28. Nancy Staudt, et. al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1909, 1932-34 (2005) (footnotes omitted). The thirteen textual canons or rationales
listed by Staudt are:
Avoid rendering language superfluous.
Ejusdem generis: where general words follow specific words, the general words
are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those enumerated by
the pre-ceding specific words. Where the opposite sequence is found (i.e., specific words following general ones) the doctrine is equally applicable and restricts application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumer-ated.
Expressio unius: the enumeration of certain things in a statute suggests that the
legislators did not intend to include things not listed.
Legislative drafting mistakes should be ignored.
Nosciture a sociies: the meaning of one term is "known by its associates" (i.e.,
understood in the context of other words in the list).
Placement of a section has no relevance.
Placement of a section has relevance.
Plain, ordinary meaning of the law: adherence to the common usage or common understanding of the words.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010

5

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 3

120

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:115

However categorized, "Itlextual canons focus on the language of the statute itself and the relationships between statutory provisions."3 0 "[Blased
on logic and the use of language,31 these "canons include rules of syntax" and "seek to gage the most likely meaning of statutory language." 3
Courts use these canons to "determin[e] ordinary meaning."3 But, the
relationship between plain meaning and textual canons is, admittedly,
murky. Some have suggested that plain meaning is a textual canon;35
others have suggested that judges use textual canons to determine the
"plain meaning."
The next section of this Article will explore the interrelationship between canons of construction and plain meaning. Ultimately, this Article will suggest a few canons of construction that seem intertwined

Punctuation, grammar, syntax: the act of looking to punctuation, grammar, or
syntax to decide meaning of the law.
Statutory headings have no relevance.
Statutory headings have relevance.
Technical meaning: interpret words in accordance with some background legal
concept (like the category of employee) or in line with a judicially developed
term of art.
Whole act rule: look to the context of the word or provision by looking to the
other parts of the statute to ensure that the will of the legislature is executed.
Id. at 1933-34.
29. Lee Epstein, et. al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and
Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 305, 329 n.50
(2003) ("The textual canons ... include the plain meaning rule, noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the whole act rule, and the effects of
punctuation, headings, and the placement of the section within the statute.").
30. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L. J.
341, 352 (2010).
31. Scott Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative
Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 45, 74 (2008).
32. Id. at 74 n.139.
33. Anita S. Krishakumar, The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The Unique National Institution Canon, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1053, 1097 (2009).
34. Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation,81 TEMP.
L. REV. 635, 665 (2008); see also Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive Regime Change, 30 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1987 (2005).
35. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 28, at 1933.
36. James R. Barney, In Search of Ordinary Meaning, 85 ]. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 101, 130 (2003); see also Lars Noah, Diving Regulatory Intent: The Placefor a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 292 (2000) ("In searching for the
plain meaning of a regulation, courts sometimes deploy textualist conventions such as
canons of construction.").
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with the idea of plain meaning and will apply these canons to the Takings Clause and related constitutional provisions.
IV. (SOMETIMES USED) CANONS OF PLAIN MEANING TEXTUALISM

A. Superfluity Canon
The first difficulty that the plain language textualist confronts when
applying plain language textualism to the Takings Clause arises in regards to regulatory takings claims made by property owners against
states and municipalities (as opposed to the United States). The problem begins with the understanding that the Takings Clause does not apply to the states or any of their subdivisions (at least not directly) because the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the states."
Since the time of Barron v. Baltimore," most have accepted the conclusion that the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states.3 ' Like the rest
of the Bill of Rights, the Takings Clause applies against the states (if at
all) through incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' However, this incorporation creates an interpretational conundrum for the plain language textualist, requiring the plain

37. See, e.g., Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 415 ("The Takings Clause which is found in the Fifth Amendment - does not directly apply to the states . . . ."); Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist'sDilemma, 90 MINN. L. REv. 612, 660
n.242 (2006).
38. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). In the time surrounding the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, not all state courts to consider the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states agreed with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Barron. See People
v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). As explained by Chief Justice Spencer,
"I am, however, inclined to the opinion, that the [Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution] does extend to all judicial tribunals in the U.S., whether constituted by the
Congress of the U.S., or the states individually." Id.
39. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 55 (2007) ("[In Barron the United States Supreme Court held that states were
not subject to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . ").
40. See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 CoLm. L. REv. 782, 860 n.369 (1995) (discussing
the differing opinions of when the Takings Clause was first incorporated); Donna R.
Christie, A Tale of Three Takings: Taking Analysis in Land Use Regulation in the United
States, Australia, and Canada,32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 343 (2007) (recognizing that regulatory takings claims "did not become common ... until the 1970s").
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language textualist to contravene one of the textualist canons, often
known as the "superfluity canon.""
In interpreting any legal text, the textualist often turns to the "superfluity canon," which was founded on the "conclusion that we shall
not presume the legislature to waste words when enacting laws."42 Also
referred to as the "textual integrity canon," this maxim urges the interpreter of a text to "[alvoid interpreting a provision in a way that would
render other provision[s] of the [text] superfluous."' Essentially, this
"surplusage canon[]"" presumes that a statute will not contain "linguistic
surplusage."a This canon will apply with particular force in a textualist
interpretation of the Constitution, "[s]ince a textualist strongly presumes
that each word in the Constitution has meaning rather than being surplusage."46
At this point, this Article assumes that any one demanding that
the Takings Clause be limited to "plain meaning" would subscribe to the
41. Damien M. Schiff, Purposivism and the "ReasonableLegislator": A Review Essay of
Justice Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1081, 1087 n.37 (2007)
("The 'superfluity' canon is another window to purposefulness that the textualist will
look through upon occasion."); see also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L.
REV. 347, 355 (2005) ("[Textualists (like all other interpreters) embrace the presumption against surplusage . . . .").
42. Schiff, supra note 41, at 1087 n.37.
43. Brian M. Saxe, When a Rigid Textualism Fails: Damagesfor ADA Employment Retaliation,2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 555, 578 n.145 (2006).
44. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, "Is There a Text in this Class?" The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 642 (2005).
45. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 CoLUM. L.
REV. 70, 98 (2006).

46. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 487, 532 (2007); see
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme
Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2235 (1996) (noting
that even as applied to the Constitution "ordinary rules of textual construction suggest
that interpretations that produce surplusage should be avoided").
47. Making arguments for others, or making assumptions about agreements others
would make, has inherent unfairness. Given the number of authors who accept the tie
between textualism and the superfluity canon, the assumption seems fair. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegal, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 117, 127-28
(2009) ("[Tlextualists employ ... the presumption against statutory redundancy .. . on
the ground that a legislature probably did not intend to include superfluous provisions."); Treanor, supra note 46, at 532 ("[A] textualist strongly presumes that each word
in the Constitution has meaning rather than being surplusage."); see also William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 998 (2009); Ilya Somin, Gonzalez v. Raich: Federalismas a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELLJ. L. & PUB POL'Y
507, 533 (2006).
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canons of textualist interpretation, such as the superfluity or surplusage
canon."8 Professor Gerhardt puts it in these terms: "For anyone who
claims to be a textualist (and that ought to be all of us!), each word of
the constitutional text is supposed to have meaning."" Perhaps not all
textualists agree, but at least some textualists urge that textualism requires50 those who interpret the Constitution to follow the surplusage or
superfluity canon whenever possible, as it is consistent with, or even required by, textualism." According to one commentator, a constitutional
interpretation that leads to surplusages "should be untenable to textualists."" Put another way, "[tiextualists presume that each word has an
5 Not all agree
ordinary, natural meaning.""
that plain meaning requires
using textualist canons; however, many suggest the link and tie the canons to plain meaning, explicitly or implicitly." Thus, this Article presumes that a person relying on plain meaning would embrace (or per-

48. See, e.g., Laura Michelle Stewart, Comment, Take Flight by Cyber-Sight: The
Failureof Courts to Require the Americans With DisabilitiesAct Title III Public Accommodations Provision to Govern Public Places Such as an Airline's Website, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV.
275, 281 n.33 (2004) ("Textualists will usually allow these types of canons to be used in
order to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of a term or phrase within a statute."); Manning, supra note 45, at 98; Robert C. Power, The Fourth Revolution, 52 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1699, 1712 n.75 (1995).
49. Michael J. Gerhardt, Prelude to Armageddon, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 399, 401 (2005).
50. But see Damien Schiff, Nothing New Under the Sun: The Minimalism of ChiefJustice Roberts and the Supreme Court's Recent Environmental Law Jurisprudence, 15 Mo.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 36 (2007) ("Although not strictly speaking part of a textualist
analysis, the use of canons [(e.g., the superfluity canon)} often goes hand in hand with a
plain meaning interpretation, and a judge's adherence to textualism frequently accompanies an acceptance of canons in legal interpretation.").
51. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Response, Making War, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 123, 124 (2007) (endeavoring to "supplement [their] textualist reading by exploring constitutional structure, which should not tolerate the redundancies"); see also
Treanor, supra note 46, at 532 ("[A textualist strongly presumes that each word in the
Constitution has meaning rather than being surplusage.").
52. Power, supra note 47, at 1712 n.75.
53. Heidi A. Sorenson, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
and Sexual OrientationDiscrimination,81 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2108 (1993); see also Treanor,
supra note 46, at 532; Michael J. Gerhardt, Prelude to Armageddon, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 399,
401 (2007); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76
CHI. KENT L. REV. 103, 124 (2000) ("[Tlextualism, as practiced by someone like Akhil
Amar, seems to presuppose that each word has been exquisitely chosen to fit a completely consistent constitutional vision.").
54. See discussion supra Part Ill.
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haps should be found to embrace) the surplusage canon inasmuch as the
canon seems to rely on the notion that each word has meaning."
Commentators and Supreme Court Justices use the superfluity canon to point out that one or more constitutional provisions become surplusage when other provisions of the Constitution are interpreted using
a methodology other than (some form of) textualism.16 Implicitly, this
argument suggests that an interpretation of one constitutional provision
must be incorrect if it causes another provision to become surplusage."
For example, Justice Thomas has argued that the current understanding
of the Commerce Clause renders "superfluous" the Article I, Section
Eight clauses "permitting Congress to enact bankruptcy laws, coin money, fix weight and measure standards, punish counterfeiters, establish
post offices, or grant patents or copyrights."" Despite the fact that the
pertinent words of the Constitution have not changed since 1789, reliance on the superfluity canon, as used by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in United States v. Lopez,59 had little support in journals and law
reviews prior to that opinion. 60 After Justice Thomas' Lopez concurrence,
55. In the end, the author recognizes that he seeks to put up a plain meaning "straw
man" in order to knock it down. The author hopes, of course, that this conclusion is sufficiently justified by the argument made.
56. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 256 (2004) (Necessary and Proper Clause); Brian C.
Kalt, The ConstitutionalCasefor the Impeachabilityof Former FederalOfficials: An Analysis
of the Law, History, and Practice of Late Impeachment, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 13, 66 (2001)
(Removal Clause); Robert C. Power, The Fourth Revolution, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1699,
1712 n.75 (1995) (Taxing and Spending Clause).
57. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency'sNew Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1346, 1365 (1994) (suggesting a similarity between "reducing several clauses of the
Constitution to surplusage" and "making textual analysis of ... clauses of the Constitution irrelevant")
58. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 2235; Tom Stacy, What's Wrong with Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 247 n.19 (1995).
59. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
60. While computerized databases of law review articles do not reflect all available
scholarship, in general searches of these databases provide a fairly comprehensive overview. Here, searches of the "Journals and Law Reviews" database in Westlaw, using the
search terms "superfluity," "superfluous," or "surplusage" along with "Is 'commerce
clause," reveal that Justice Thomas generally led the commentators, rather than the other
way around. But see, Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional Commerce Power,60 TEMP. L. Q. 901, 906-07 (1987). Interestingly, of the approximately 150 articles (including student notes and comments) to mention "superfluous,"
"superfluity," or "surplusage" in the same paragraph with "commerce clause" only two
even mention the Cirillo and Eisenhofer article. Russell L. Weaver, Lopez and the Federalization of Criminal Law, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 815, 818 n.17 (1996) and Michael J. Trapp,
Casenote, A Small Step Towards Restoring the Balance of Federalism: A Limit to Federal
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commentators published at least four dozen articles discussing the textualist superfluity canon, as related to the Commerce Clause.6 1 But,
Commerce Clause interpretation may also create surplusage as related to
the Foreign Commerce Clause6 2 and others have found surplusage in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of
power to Congress."
Quite plainly, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the reverse incorporation of the Equal Protection Clause into the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment violates the superfluity canon, at least in the opinion
of many authors.' At the same time, those who write about textualism
suggest that textualism must abide by the superfluity canon when inter-

Power Under the Commerce Clause, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 1471, 1477 n.38 (1996). However,
Justice Thomas did not cite to the Cirillo and Eisenhofer article either, which raises
another question commentators may ask themselves, "If I publish a law review article
and no one reads it, is it still an article?" Undeniably, commentators pay attention to the
writings of Supreme Court Justices (note the number of post-Lopez commerce
clause/superfluity articles). But, do Supreme Court Justices read articles by commentators, and should they?
61. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1755 (2003); Stephen
M. Durden, Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections are More Equal Than
Others, 26 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 337, 344 n.38 (2008); Michael Landau, What if the AntiBootlegging Statutes are Upheld Under the Commerce Clause?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 153,
170 (2008); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 349-50 (2004); Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: ConstitutionalLimits on Quasi-CopyrightLegislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081,
1101-02 n.108 (2008); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett,and Protectionfor Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1191-92 (2002).
62. Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Power to Regulate "Commerce with Foreign Nations" in
a Global Economy and the Future of American Democracy: An Essay, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
25, 33 (2001); see also Somin, supra note 47, at 509-10.
63. Christine E. Enemark, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Forcing the Federal
Communications Commission into a New Constitutional Regime, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 215, 253-56 (1997).
64. Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, 1306 n.59 (2009); Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams:
Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 623, 692 (2006);
Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Boiling v. Sharpe, Korematsu, and The Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L.
REv. 1879, 1883 (2006); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-OrReveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV.
L. REv. 110, 193 n.353 (1999).
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preting the Constitution."5 However, as noted, incorporation and reverse incorporation violate the textualist surplusage canon.66
Dean Treanor notes that when Professor Akhil Amar (a textualist of
one variety or another) argues that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause has a "core meaning that simply restates the Fifth Amendment's
Grand Jury Clause," Professor Amar creates a constitutional surplusage,
which "logically leads to the question, why did the founders include a
Due Process Clause?"'6 One of the most significant surplusages is that
caused by incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. As explained by one commentator,
"[Tihe Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, once incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment, makes the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause surplusage."'6 Going in the other direction, "equat[ing]
due process [in the Fifth Amendment] with equal protection renders the
latter phrase mere surplusage within section [one] of the Fourteenth
Amendment."6 In fact, the entire Bill of Rights can be viewed as surplusage." Dean Kanter explains as follows:
Sole reliance on the Due Process Clause for incorporation would seem to
imply that due process itself must contain the content of the incorporated Bill of Rights clauses. If so, an objector could claim this would
mean that Fifth Amendment due process also contains the content of the
other Bill of Rights provisions leaving them technically as "mere surplusage," a presumptively inadmissible interpretation.7 '
For the plain language (or any other) textualist, the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause must seem like being trapped in a room of mirrors, with various clauses reflecting, while at
the same time containing, each other. The Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause incorporates most of the Bill of Rights, suggesting that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment must have contained
65. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41
UCLA L. REv. 953, 982 (1994); Farber & McDonnell, supra note 44, at 642.
66. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Come Back to the Nickel and Five: Tracing the Warren Court's
Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1203, 1209-10 (2002); Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process have an OriginalMeaning? On Originalism,Due Process,
ProceduralInnovation .. . and ParkingTickets, 60 OKLA L. REv. 1, 28 n.113 (2007).
67. Treanor, supra note 46, at 532.
68. Rosenthal, supra note 66, at 28 n.113; Chen, supra note 66, at 1209-10.
69. Chen, supranote 66, at 2010.
70. Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 623, 692 (2006).
71. Id.; see also Nelson Lund, The Past and Futureof the Individual'sRight to Arms, 31
GA. L. REv. 1, 51 n.118 (1996).
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the Bill of Rights; so, when the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, it
incorporated most of the Bill of Rights, ificluding one clause (the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause) which already contained most of the
Bill of Rights; consequently, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights twice (or something like
that). Little wonder that textualists, particularly plain language textualists, often have trouble accepting due process incorporation. The problem lies, however, with plain language textualism.
Once an interpreter of the Constitution demands that a phrase or
clause has plain meaning, then that interpreter should be held to answer
for the absurd results required by following such a strict rule. The alternative, with regard to the Takings Clause would be to reject incorporation, because the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not
bring with it a Takings Clause, whereas the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause has the "tag-along" Takings Clause. Ultimately, the examples above demonstrate that textualists, or at least some textualists,
seek to avoid interpretations of one provision of the Constitution, which
would make another provision surplusage.
The surplusage difficulty caused by incorporation of the Takings
Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause exists
only if a Takings Clause claim is brought against a state or one of its
subdivisions. The Due Process Clause surplusage does not exist where
the Takings Clause applies against the United States. Likewise, it could
be argued that the surplusage concern does not really exist inasmuch as
the plain meaning of the Takings Clause can still be applied against the
United States." However, as with almost any constitutional right, re72. One might justifiably wonder how takings law could have developed if the Supreme Court heard only takings claims against the United States. Hence, a vast majority
of the significant regulatory takings claims cases (particularly those regulatory takings
claims cases based on regulations of land use) since the 1970's have been against states
and their subdivisions. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(land use regulatory takings claim); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005);
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (land use
regulatory takings claim); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (land use regulatory takings claim); Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998);
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (land use regulatory
takings claim); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (land use regulatory takings claim); Duquesne Light
Company v. Barosch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (land use regulatory takings claim); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bitumin-
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turning to the days of Baron v. Baltimore" is highly unlikely, so at least
as to Takings Clause claims against the states and their subdivisions, the
plain language textualist will be confronted with the surplusage created
by incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Simply put, with regard to Takings Clause claims against a state or
local government, the plain meaning textualist self-righteously declares
that plain meaning textualism eliminates personal predilections and policy choices. Then, the plain language textualist uses that approach to
declare a plain meaning to the Takings Clause, while at the same time
ignoring (innocently or intentionally) that the Takings Clause only applies after first creating surplusage in the Constitution, in violation of a
generally accepted canon of textualist interpretation.
ous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (land use regulatory takings
claim); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (arguably
a land use regulatory takings claim); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (land use regulatory takings claim); Penn Central
Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (land use regulatory
takings claim). But see Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (regulatory taking claim related to funding health benefits); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997)
(holding that escheat of fractional interest in allotment of Indian lands constitutes a taking); Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that loss of reversionary right is not a
taking); United States v. Sperry, 493 U.S. 52 (1989); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987) (holding that regulation of welfare benefits is not a taking); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987) (holding that regulation of Indian devisee rights is a taking); United
States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984) (holding that cities and states are protected by the Takings Clause); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that a regulation of pesticides was not a taking in light of an available Tucker Act remedy). Of course, state and local government cases dominate the land use regulatory
takings cases because state and local governments engage in the most regulation of land.
By the same token, plain language textual interpretations of the Takings Clause focus on
"taking" physical property. While so many of the federal takings claims revolve around
ownership interests or regulation of business, in none of these cases is physical possession of land or taking title involved or relevant. This difference highlights the need for
takings jurisprudence to rely on both cases brought to the Supreme Court and to other
courts. If the Supreme Court heard only federal takings claims then takings jurisprudence (and academic discussion of takings jurisprudence) might have evolved differently. For example, whereas in state law takings cases the Supreme Court notes that takings
claims concern "the parcel as a whole," see, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104, in federal
law takings cases the Supreme Court has found a taking of very miniscule pieces of
property, see, e.g., Babbitt, 519 U.S. at 234; Hodel, 481 U.S. at 704.
73. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
74. Another difficulty with applying plain language textualism concerns another
aspect of incorporating the Bill of Rights. The plain meaning textualist (indeed no textualist) can argue that the actual textual meaning of the Due Process Clause is that no
state (or its subdivision) shall violate one of the Bill of Rights. First, if this is the textual
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Application of the Takings Clause to the federal government fails to
eliminate the surplusage concern for the plain language textualist.
When the federal government enacts a law limiting the use of land or
other property or over regulates land, property or business, it likely has
done so through the Commerce Clause (particularly since a regulatory
takings claim concerns a regulation of property, as opposed to physical
possession of property). For example, when Congress protects wetlands,
it does so through the Commerce Clause." This broad interpretation of
the Commerce Clause, to regulate non-navigable wetlands, next to navigable water, strongly suggests the power to prohibit felonies on waters
used for trade, including the high seas. Such an interpretation thus
renders superfluous" the Article 1, Section Eight, Clause Ten power to
"punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas.""
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, then what would be the
textual meaning of the identically worded Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause?
Second, if the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does carry the same meaning as the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, then Barron was wrongly decided.
75. See, e.g., Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 341-43 (1997) (discussing Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wetlands).
76. See, e.g., Steven K. Balman, Constitutional Irony: Gonzales v. Raich, Federalism
and Congressional Regulation of Intrastate Activities under the Commerce Clause, 41 TULSA
L. REV. 125, 160-61 (2005) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring)); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional
Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 350 (2004); Brett Boyce, Originalismand the Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 1030 n.670 (1998). A holding that the Commerce Clause grants Congress power over wetlands virtually demands a holding that the
Commerce Clause grants power to Congress to punish piracy and felonies on the high
seas, i.e., (1) Congress has Commerce Power over wetlands that adjoin rivers and harbors that flow in to the high seas; (2) This wetland power flows from Congressional
Commerce Clause power over rivers and harbors; (3) This power over river and harbors
includes power over vessels; (4) This power over vessels includes not only vessels within
a harbor but also vessels as they travel the high seas from harbor to harbor. Put another
way, power over the wetlands and harbors is far more attenuated than power over vessels
on the high seas (vessels that are actually engaged in transport tied to interstate commerce). See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). Regulation of wetlands or the use
of land in general may also make superfluous Article I, Section Eight, Clause Seventeen
of the Constitution, which states, "The Congress shall have power . . . [tlo exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent
of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful buildings." U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 17.
Perhaps this superfluity argument is a bit of a stretch, but the argument would be: assuming that commerce power grants power to regulate use of land, and that the Supremacy Clause makes federal law supreme, then Congress does not need extra power to
regulate land, and exclusive power is superfluous when federal power is supreme. Indeed, Article 1, Section Eight, Clause Seventeen suggests that Congress should not have
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Admittedly, some federal laws regulate without resort to an overexpanded Commerce Clause (i.e., a Commerce Clause interpretation,
which makes some of the rest of Article 1, Section Eight superfluous).
However, when Congress must resort to a superfluity-creating Commerce Clause, Congress should not be permitted to rely on plain meaning textualism to limit the meaning of the Takings Clause. Similarly, a
state may rely on plain meaning textualism to urge that the plain meaning of the Constitution requires a holding that the Takings Clause does
not apply to the states. However, once the state concedes that the Takings Clause applies to the states via incorporation through the Due
Process Clause and (consequently) in violation of the superfluity canon,
the state should not be heard to argue that it can now rely on some purported plain meaning of the Takings Clause.
Ultimately, the superfluity canon suggests that a drafter relying on
the obviousness (plain existence) of words would not use redundant
words, phrases or clauses. Plain meaning textualism suggests that when
the author writes, "Do not violate due process," the author means, "Do
not violate due process." Once written, the command need not be rewritten, as the second writing of the same phrase adds nothing to the
meaning of the document. Plain meaning textualism, which is based on
the plainness and obviousness of the meaning of words, may not require
use of the superfluity canon, which is based on the obviousness and
plainness of the existence of the black marks commonly referred to as
the Constitution;"' however, a person who chooses to demand a plain
language meaning to the Takings Clause and purports to do so in the
name of eliminating personal predilections in constitutional interpretation should, at a minimum, address the application of the superfluity canon.
B.

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Another "textualist rule[] for interpreting statutes include[s] [the]
canon of construction,... expressio unius est exclusio alterius." 9 "This

the power to regulate land and buildings unless Congress takes the land with the consent
of the states. This interpretation is consistent with the textualist argument (which the
Supreme Court rejected in Kelo) that the government could not take land, unless it took
the land for a public use.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
78. Stephen Durden, Plain Language Textualism: Some PersonalPredilectionsare More
Equal Than Others, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 337, 340 (2008).

79. Jonathan Z. Cannon, Words and Worlds: The Supreme Court in Rapanos and Carabell, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 293 (2007); see also John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doc-
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Latin maxim can be translated roughly as 'the express mention of one
thing excludes anything else not mentioned."'" As applied to legislation,
this canon means that .'[wihen the legislature provide[s] a specific term
or a list of specific terms, the implication is that the legislature intended
to exclude others."'
This canon, sometimes referred to as a "negative
on the familiar idea that the enumeration of
"rests
implication canon,"8
specific matters in a statute logically" implies the exclusion of others.""
Using the expressio unis maxim when interpreting a statute does
not, in and of itself, justify using the maxim as a guide to constitutional
interpretation. Indeed, many years ago, Myres McDougal and Ashe
Lans, relying on the Federalist No. 83 (Hamilton), stated, "The general
view has been that the maxim of construction expressio unius est exclusio
alterius has no validity as a canon of constitutional construction."" As
McDougal and Florentino explained a few years later, "innocent reliance
upon the question-begging latinism inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
[sic] . . . is assuredly not a compulsion of logic.""

As stated by Nicholas

trine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2466 n.285 (2003); Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules:
The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 23 (2003); Lee Epstein,
Nancy Staudt & Peter Wiedenbeck, Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation
and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 305, 329
n.50 (2003); Adam Milani, Go Ahead, Make My 90 Days: Should Plaintiffs be Required to
Provide Notice to Defendants Before Filing Suit Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 107, 145, 146 n.216 (2001).
80. Mullins, supra note 79, at 23; see also Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle:
Text, Autonomy, and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431, 458 (2001) ("[T]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other. . . .").
81. Catherine E. Creely, Comment, Prognosis Negative: Why the Language of the
Hatch-Waxman Act Spells Trouble for Reverse Payment Agreements, 56 CATH. U. L. REV.
155, 178 (2006).
82. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.REV. 747, 790 (1999).
83. However, not all commentators agree that logic requires the canon to be followed. As put by Yale professor Myres S. McDougal and his co-author Yale instructor
Florentino P. Feliciano, the "implication" demanded by the canon "is assuredly not a
compulsion of logic." Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Legal Regulation of
Resort to InternationalCoercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE
L.J. 1057, 1147 n.261 (1959). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621, 664 (1990).
84. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1724 (2004).
85. Myers McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, III. The Constitutional
Division of Control Over the Making of InternationalAgreements, 54 YALE L.J. 211, 237
n.99 (1945).
86. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 83, at 1147 n.261. The careful reader would
notice two interesting aspects of the McDougal and Feliciano quotes. The first one is
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Quinn Rosenkranz, "[N]owhere does the Constitution suggest anything
like an immutable code of interpretive canons, and the Court has never
implied that expression unius is a constitutional rule.""
Others have suggested that the rule should be applied where appropriate. For instance, Vasan Kesavan, who advocates that the "single, true
method of constitutional interpretation is original, objective public
meaning textualism,""8 urges that "[a]rguments from expressio unius est
exclusio alterius must be contextually and sensitively applied to avoid
wooden readings of the Constitution."8 9 Put another way, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius .... applies only when a reasonable person
would justifiably infer a negative implication from reading the specific
that their version of the maxim begins with "inclusio unius" rather than "exclusio unius."
McDougal and Feliciano are not the only ones to make that choice. Numerous writers
choose the "inclusio" version of the maxim. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Lauren
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1222 (2008); Frank B. Cross, The
Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 2004
(2007); Tom Levinson, Confrontation, Fidelity, Transformation: The "Fundamentalist"Judicial Persona of Justice Antonin Scalia, 26 PACE L. REV. 445, 484 (2006); Burt Neuborne,
"The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm The Reader Became the Book": Reading the
Bill of Rights as a Poem: An Essay in Honor of the FifthiethAnniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2022 (2004); William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1490 n.41 (1987); Howard I. Kalodner & Verne
W. Vance, Jr., The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic
Property, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1109 (1959); John Marshall Gest, The Writings Of Sir
Edward Coke, 18 YALE L.J. 504, 530 (1909).
87. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2107 (2002).
88. Colby & Smith, supra note 2, at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. LJ. 1113, 1129 (2003)).
89. Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief,44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 12 (2002). Kesavan's personal opposition to a "wooden" interpretation conflicts
with the opinion in his article that the text of the Constitution requires the use of textualism as the sole interpretive methodology. Kesavan does not assert that the text of the
Constitution somehow forbids "wooden" interpretations. Kesavan's choice may be an
outstanding choice, with which many would agree, but it remains personal in that it is
not required by, well, anything or anyone, even the Constitution. Avoiding "wooden"
constitutional interpretation conflicts with the assertion that constitutional interpretation
must follow rules, i.e., Kesavan's "rule" that the Constitution demands textualism. Textualism seeks to avoid personal preferences. Assuming that the words of the Constitution
create a "wooden" result, the textualist should explain what other part of the text or what
part of textualism permits or requires the interpreter to find a "non-wooden" meaning. As
with this entire Article, the point is that all constitutional interpretation is personal, because no method of constitutional interpretation avoids personal choice (choice outside
the bounds of the preferred or chosen method).
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text in context."90 In fact, Thomas B. McAfee and Calvin H. Johnson, in
separate articles, discuss the "appropriate" use of the canon, 9' while Saikrishna Prakash labels some clauses "poor candidatels] for the application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim."2
Whatever may be an appropriate or poor candidate for application
of the canon, "[tihe [Supreme] Court has embraced this principle of expressio unius,"9 3 but only "on a selective basis."" Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v._Thornton,95 expressly relied on
the maxim to invalidate the Arkansas constitution's prohibition on a person who had served two terms as a United States Senator or three terms
as a United States Representative from running for re-election. 96 In Mar90. Manning, supra note 84, at 1671.
91. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAfee, The Federal System as a Bill of Rights: Original Understandings,Modern Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 32-33 (1998); Calvin H. Johnson,
The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 28 (2005).
92. Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1802
(2006) (referring to the impeachment provisions of the Constitution).
93. Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional Approach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 423 n.146 (2003).
94. Id.; see, e.g., Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 522-23 (2006) (applying the canon to the Eleventh Amendment); josh Chafetz, Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 181-82 (2008) (applying the
canon to the resignation of members of the United States House of Representatives); Dan
T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of the Federalist and Its Impact on
Constitutional Interpretation,56 DuKE L.J. 469, 504 n.203 (2006) (concerning debts of the
United States); Eugene Kontorovich, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1168 (2005) (applying the canon to the Takings Clause); Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court as Quasi-International
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Originaland Exclusive jurisdiction Over Treaty-based Suits
by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1765, 1820-21 (2004) (applying the
canon to the Eleventh Amendment); Jason Mazzone, 90 IOwA L. REV. 1747, 1756-57
(2005) (discussing the canon's application to Article V of the Constitution); Robert G.
Natelson, Paper Money and the Original Understandingof the Coinage Clause, 31 HARV.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1017, 1024 (2008) (considering the canon with the federal authority to
issue paper currency); Saikrishna Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1035 (2006) (applying the canon to the removal of officers and to impeachment provisions); Paul E. Salamanca and James E. Keller, The Legislative Privilege to Judge the Qualifications,Elections
and Returns of Members, 95 Ky. L.J. 241, 308 (2006-2007) (applying the canon to age and
length of citizenship qualifications for Senate); A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085,
1089-90 (applying the canon to the Eighth Amendment and punitive damages).
95. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
96. Id. at 793 n.9. On the other hand, in that same case, Justice Thomas, dissenting,
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia concurring in dissent, expressly rejected the application of the maxim as inconsistent with federalism. Id. at 86869. Justice Thomas' rejection of the maxim, in deference for an apparently (to Justice
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bury v. Madison,97 Chief Justice Marshall applied the expressio unius
principle to declare unconstitutional Congress's grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in excess of the grant made in Article III of
the Constitution.98 Other Justices who have advocated or used this canon include: Justice Scalia,99 Justice Barbour, 0 0 Justice Thomas,o01 and
Justice Story."' Additionally, the Court has used this principle in construing a number of state constitutions. 03 This occasional reliance on
the expressio unius canon does not suggest even regular reliance, inasmuch as members of the Court, who often rely on some version of textualism and this canon,'t 4 have found this canon superseded by other
principles.' 5 However, the fact remains that despite how rarely the

Thomas) superior principle (neither of which is actually in the text of the Constitution),
illustrates the general premise of this Article - that neutral (or other principles) of constitutional law neither limit discretion nor personal choice as to how to interpret the Constitution. Only in a world of fantasy would someone argue that Justice Thomas (or any
concurring Justice) was unaware that choosing federalism over expressio unius would
result in validating the Arkansas provision. The Constitution does not mention either
constitutional principle (and, obviously, does not state which principle is superior to the
other). Consequently, since no transcript exists of Justice Thomas' ruling process, nor
does Justice Thomas state that federalism always trumps expressio unius (or all other
canons of construction), it may be that Justice Thomas picked a result and then rationalized it. Justice Thomas thus demonstrates the unprincipled nature of reliance on "neutral" principles.
97. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
98. See, e.g., David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1791, 1919-21 (1998).
99. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudenceof Tradition and Justice Scalia's
Unwritten Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 19, 68 (2000) (suggesting that Scalia makes a
type of expressio unius argument in support of his view that the Constitution does not
protect the right to an abortion); David C. Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should be a Constitutional Comparativist ... Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1265 (2007) (suggesting that
Justice Scalia would use the expressio unius canon when interpreting the Eighth
Amendment); Milani, supra note 79, at 146 n.216 (noting that Justice Scalia has defended
the use of the expressio unius canon); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and The Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50 n.207 (1994); David Sosa, The Unintentional Fallacy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 919,928 (1998).
100. Spencer, supra note 94, at 1133 n.220.
101. Id.; see, e.g., James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment andJustice Scalia's "Split Personality", 16 J.L. & POL. 231, 233 (2000).
102. Laura A. Till, Justice Clarence Thomas: The Emerging "New Federalist" on the
Rehnquist Court, 12 REGENT U. L. REv. 585,622 n.279 (1999-2000).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Macon County, 99 U.S. 582, 590 (1878); Pine Grove
TP v. Talcott, 86 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1873).
104. See Milani, supra note 79, at146 n.216.
105. See discussion supra Part IV.B.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss1/3

20

Durden: Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools

2010]

TEXTUALIST CANONS

135

Court uses this canon, the Court has never suggested that this canon
should be completely discarded."o'
While the question of whether to apply the expressio unis canon to
constitutional adjudication may be debated among some, a plain language textualist has less room to complain about being saddled with the
interpretive rule. Indeed, "[cIlosely related to the idea of plain language
as [a] primary interpretive device is the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."'O' Use of the canon clearly comports with textualism,
even plain meaning textualism.'" Consider, for example, whether an
ordinance for selling dogs in city parks applies to cats:109
What result? In this situation, the job of a literalist (or even a less narrowly focused textualist) is relatively easy: the text of the statute mentions dogs not cats. Case closed. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius:
the mention of only one necessarily excludes others not mentioned.o
Charles Trefer describes the expressio unius canon as a "textual canon,""I while Eric Eagle explains, "The doctrine of expressio unius reinforces the plain meaning interpretation."112 Still another commentator,
Jeffrey G. Miller, states, "The ... expressio unius . . . canoni] . .. support[s] a plain reading meaning."1 3 This discussion does not prove that a
106. See Orrin G. Hatch, JudicialNomination FilibusterCause and Cure, 2005 UTAH L.
803, 827 n.130 (2005) (applying the canon to suggest that filibusters of judicial
nominations are prohibited by the canon and noting that "[t]he Supreme Court applies
th[e] canon to constitutional provisions"). But see Michael H. Herhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster,21 CONST. COMMENT 445, 456 (2004) (disagreeing with application of the canon to filibusters).
107. Philip R. Principe, Secret Codes, Military Hospitals, and the Law of Armed Conflict:
Could Military Medical Facilities'Use of Encrypted Communications Subject Them to Attack
Under International Law?, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 727, 741 (2002).
108. Lee, supra note 94, at 1820 (characterizing the author's expressio unius application to interpreting the Eleventh Amendment as essentially a plain-language argument);
see also Dominick Vetri, Communicating Between Planets: Law Reform for the Twenty-First
Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 169, 211-12 (1998).
109. Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murasho, The Rules EnablingAct and the ProceduralSubstantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation,93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 46 (2008).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Charles Trefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 214 n.34, 218 (2000); Jim Chen, Law as a Species of
Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1302 (1995).
112. Eric Eagle, Alverez-Machain v. United States and Alverez-Machain v. Sosa: The
Brooding Omnipresences of Natural Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 149,
170 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
113. Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory PreclusionsAgainst Successive
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens Part Two: Statutory Preclusions on
EPA Enforcement, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34 (2005).
REV.
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plain language textualist would generally, or even ever, support the exclusio unius canon. Instead, this discussion demonstrates that a person
who claims to rely on what is plainly in the text cannot complain when
asked to consider the meaning of plainly missing text.
With regard to the Takings Clause's application to the states, the
expressio unius canon strongly suggests that the Takings Clause does
not apply to the states. The Fifth Amendment contains a Due Process
Clause and a Takings Clause." 4 The Fourteenth Amendment contains a
Due Process Clause, but plainly omits a Takings Clause." 5 Whatever argument may be made for incorporation of various provisions of the Bill
of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, it
seems as though a person who asserts the plain meaning of a clause in
the Fifth Amendment is hard pressed to assert that the Fourteenth
Amendment gives life to that clause when that clause is plainly left out
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The omission of the Takings Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment can be explained in a variety of ways. Some of these explanations
seem rational in light of different interpretive methodologies. However,
none of them seem rational for a person claiming to rely on the plain
meaning of words. One way to explain the absence of the Takings Clause
from the Fourteenth Amendment follows: The drafters/framers" 6 of the
Fourteenth Amendment accidentally (unintentionally) failed to copy the
entire Fifth Amendment; the framers/drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to include both the Due Process Clause and the Takings
Clause, but failed to do so; but, the failure to include the Takings Clause
should not bind the framers/drafters; and, the inclusion of one of the
clauses of the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted to mean inclusion
of all the clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
However, this approach creates three problems for the plain meaning textualist. First, the inclusion of the Takings Clause within the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause forces the interpreter into
the redundancy (superfluity canon) problem referred to previously." 7
Second, this approach forces the plain language textualist to admit that
the meaning of words, particularly in the Constitution, is not really

114. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
116. The terms "drafter/framers" and "framer/drafters" encompass the ideas of both
"the framers" and "the drafters" (those usually unnamed people given credit for bringing
the country and the Constitution into existence). The use of the term is simply a matter
of convention, but not necessarily conviction.
117. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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plain; rather, the meaning of words must be based on the contexts of a
variety of words. Third, it forces the plain language textualist to admit
that the drafters of various provisions of the Constitution were not such
skilled draftsmen after all, and while an interpreter might like to rely on
the draftsmen's words, that interpreter certainly cannot claim reliance
based on the skill of the draftsmen. The inescapable conclusion from
this approach is that not only must the interpreter rely on context, rather
than plain meaning, but also that such poor draftsmanship requires a
skeptical reading of the words to interpret their meaning.
An "accidental" failure to repeat the Takings Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, followed by a judicial incorporation, cannot in any
way support the idea of reliance on the plain meaning of words.118
Whether the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intentionally or accidentally failed to include the Takings Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, plain-language textualism leads to interpretational conundrums. Ultimately, in order to achieve their desired interpretation, those
who purport to rely on the plain meaning of the Takings Clause must
inevitably ignore the plain meaning suggested by the omission of the
words from the Fourteenth Amendment - specifically that the Takings
Clause does not apply to the states."'
Instead, the plain-language textualist can assert that the canon of
expressio unius does not apply to constitutional interpretation; rather,
the plain meaning of words, whatever they may be, must be given their
meaning; and, plainly missing words will be irrelevant to constitutional
interpretation. However, this approach cuts across the textualist goal of
relying solely on the words (and presumptively the absence of words),120
and permits the plain language textualist a power far removed from that
permitted by the text - namely, the power to pick and choose when to
apply what is often referred to as a textualist canon.121
118. Of course, another approach to the omission of the Takings Clause is to apply
the exclusio unius canon to demonstrate that the omission was intentional, leading inevitably to the conclusion that the framers/drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to protect states from the burdens of the Takings Clause.
119. See Spencer, supra note 94, at 1133 (discussing how, of course, the same violation of the expressio unius canon follows from the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
120. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, ConstitutionalHistoricism:An Examination of the
Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 1355, 1414
(2005) (discussing the significance of the absence of the word "unusual").
121. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 123, 127 (2009);Jonathan Z. Cannon, Words and Worlds: The Supreme Court
in Rapanos and Carabell, 25 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 277, 293 (2007); Chen, supra note 111, at
1302.
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Canon of ConsistentMeaning

For purposes of this section, this Article assumes that the meaning
of at least some words, phrases or clauses of the Constitution can be
plain. But, this raises the question of whether that "plain meaning"
changes when the same word, phrase or clause occurs in a different part
of the Constitution. At least occasionally (perhaps more often), the Supreme Court interprets words used in different contexts to have the
same meaning.122 According to Professor Turley, "The Supreme Court
has emphasized in matters of statutory construction (and presumably in
constitutional interpretation) that courts should 'assume] that identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
same meaning."1 23 Textualists, too, seem to agree with this "same word,
same meaning," principal. For example, Professor Amar may not be a
plain language textualist, but according to Dean Treanor, "Professor
Amar's textualism reflects a series of assumptions" including the assumption "that words used at different places in the document should be construed to mean the same thing."124 Likewise, the "textualist argument[,] ... that similar clauses in different parts of the Constitution
should be given the same meaning," has been made by others.' 5 In fact,
"[aIn implication of textualism is that a particular word or phrase retains

122. Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 431 n. 11 (2007) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall essentially made this
point in Gibbons v. Ogden by stating that the word "commerce" "must carry the same
meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain intelligible cause which alters it" (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824)). Professor
Balkin also references a debate between Professors Prakash and Vermeule as to whether
Chief Justice Marshall correctly concluded that "commerce," used three times in one sentence, would have only one meaning. Id. (citing Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149
(2003); Adrian Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175
(2003)). While this debate is tangential to this Article, one thing that the debate clearly
shows is that Professor Vermeule avoids claiming allegiance to textualism of any sort.
For example, Professor Vermeule concludes that "[tihe scope of the three commerce
clauses differ because of alternative constitutional sources authorizing congressional
power over foreign commerce and Indian commerce." Vermeule, supra at 1177.
123. Jonathan Turley, Too Clever By Half: The Unconstitutionality of PartialRepresentation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 319-20 (2008)
(quoting Sorenson v. Sec'y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)).
124. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar's Bill of Rights, MICH. L. REv. 487, 542 (2007).
125. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 779
n.32 (1994) (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Pluraljudiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1992)).
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the same meaning in different documents and, more generally, in different contexts."'2 6 Similarly, Professors Farber and McDonnell urge that
according to a classic textualist canon, "identical words in different parts
of the same act should be given the same meaning."1 27 Explained another way, "[T]extualists, like Justice Scalia, embark on an analysis of statutes which entails examination of [among other things]: (1) how the
word or phrase is used elsewhere in the same statute land] (2) how the
word or phrase is used in other statutes ..

"..

Professor Seigel, in discussing statutory construction, explains that
courts usually1 29 apply the "unitary principle"' - the principle "that
courts presume that a single term has a single meaning when it recurs
multiple times within a statute""' and "that a term occurring a single
time in a single statutory provision should have a single meaning."13 2
Professor Seigel then distinguishes the "weak unitary principle" - where
courts often use this principle merely as one important factor of determining meaning13 3 - from the "strong unitary principle" - where the unitary principle is treated as an inviolable decree.13 ' According to Professor Seigel, the Supreme Court declared the inviolability of the unitary
principle in Clark v. Martinez."' The Court further declared that even
the suggestion that a court not follow the unitary principle would be a
"'novel' and 'dangerous' . . . affront to the separation of powers."16

126. Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudenceof Interpretationin
State ConstitutionalLaw, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635, 650 (1994).
127. Farber & McDonnell, supra note 44, at 652.
128. Christopher F. Tate, Note, Getting out of "Harm's"Way: Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 101, 126 (1996); see

also Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation,Democratic Legitimacy and LegalSystem Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 273 n.115 (1997) (collecting authorities
supporting the proposition that textualists view the meaning of words as consistent
throughout the text).
129. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory
Interpretation,84 TEX. L. REv. 339, 343 (2005).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 343-46.
134. Id. at 346.
135. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
136. Siegel, supra note 129. Professor Seigel goes on to explain why the Supreme
Court erred in its declaration that when a court fails to follow the unitary principle, it
engages in a novel and dangerous affront to separation of powers. Id. While Professor
Seigel clearly does not support the use of the strong unitary principle, he accurately describes it. See id.
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This separation of powers concern may not exist when interpreting
the Constitution, but to the textualist, the canon continues to have tremendous force. Professor Amar"' suggests that any particular clause of
the Constitution should be read "against the backdrop of other clauses in
the document that use the same or similar words."" According to Dean
Treanor, Professor Amar "strong[ly] presum[es] that the meaning of
words is constant throughout the [Constitution]."I3 Professor Amar's
approach creates, or at least seeks to create, "a more holistic way of interpretation in which recurring words or phrases in the same document for his purposes, the Constitution - are read as shedding light on meaning."14
As noted by Professors Vermeule and Young, "Intratextualism has
its roots in the familiar principle of statutory construction that, ordinarily speaking, 'identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning.""

While the subtleties and com-

plexities of intratextualism go far beyond the concept that the same
word or phrase means the same thing in a different location in the Constitution, 112 intratextualism generally strives to achieve the ideals of the
same word/same meaning canon. 43 Intratextualism provides an example
of how the same word/same meaning canon applies within a single document. However, other textualists have used the same word/same meaning canon to determine the meaning of a state constitution, which has
the same words as the United States Constitution. As noted by one
commentator, "Presumably, the state constitutional provision that is
worded identically to its federal counterpart carries the same meaning,

137. Treanor, supra note 46, at 491 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999
Term, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000); Amar,
supra note 82, at 747) ("Amar has written more extensively on textualism and has
worked out its methodology and implications far more fully than anyone else, including
Justice Scalia. His HarvardLaw Review Foreword The Document and the Doctrine and his
article Intratextualism develop his approach and discuss the various textualist techniques
he applies.").
138. Akhil Reed Amar, An(other) Afterword on the Bill of Rights, 87 GEO. L.J. 2347,
2354 (1999).
139. Treanor, supra note 46, at 518.
140. Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1243, 1323 (2005).
141. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble
with Intratextualism, 113 HARv. L. REv. 730, 734 (2000).
142. See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 82.
143. Vermeule & Young, supra note 141, at 733 ("The same words, conversely, ought
generally to mean the same thing to an intratextualist.").
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while differences in wording point to differences in meaning."'" This
conclusion may be based on the traditional notion that a legislative body
will be presumed to understand the meaning of a term when it uses that
term; so, when a state adopts a constitution in 1970 (for example) with
"the phrase search and seizure," that phrase "mean[s], in general, what
th[at] same phrase means in the federal [Cjonstitution."to As explained,
by one commentator, a state court may "assume, without deciding, that
parallel state and federal constitutional provisions have identical meaning and then decide the case accordingly."l4 6 When this occurs, "[t]he
unexpressed presumption appears to be that a state constitutional provision framed in the same words as a federal provision was intended to
apply exactly like its federal model."'17
This mirroring occurs in many states with regard to a number of
provisions. As noted by Adam S. Cohen:
Even in a day when state constitutionalism is considered to have come of
age, this sort of self-imposed limitation is fairly common. The Wisconsin state courts have held that their state constitution's double-jeopardy
clause is "identical in scope and purpose" to the [Flifth [Almendment's
provision and that Supreme Court precedent will therefore govern both
state and federal double jeopardy claims. The Connecticut Supreme
Court has determined that its state due process clause and the federal
clause "have the same meanings and the same limits." The double jeopardy provision of the Maine Constitution "afford [s] protection essentially like that guaranteed by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment." And the Washington Supreme Court has held that "where
the language of the state and federal constitutions is similar, the interpretation given by the United States Supreme Court to the federal provision
48
will be applied to the state provision."

144. Richard J. Peltz, Limited Powers in the Looking-Glass: Otiose Textualism, and an
Empirical Analysis of Other Approaches, When Activists in Private Shopping Centers Claim
State ConstitutionalLiberties, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399, 400 (2005-2006). While Professor

Peltz disagrees with this presumption, his statement accurately reflects a common approach.
145. Michele M. Jochner, Survey of Illinois Law: Search and Seizure Cases, 30 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 785, 798 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
146. Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A CriticalAssessment of State Constitutional Interpretation,79 OR. L. REv. 793, 868 (2000).
147. John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS LJ. 819, 843
(1990).
148. Adam S. Cohen, More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and ConstitutionalActions for the Right to Shelter, 38 EMORY L.J. 615, 628 (1989) (third alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
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Under ."lockstep"" interpretation, the same words have the same
literal and interpreted meaning.15 o Likewise, another commentator, David B. Kopel, declared, "It is simply perverse to suggest that words which
from century to century and from state to state have had such a widelyshared meaning in state constitutions, should have an entirely contrary
meaning when the same words appear in the federal constitution."15 '
Similarly, Professor Saikrishna Prakash urges "intrasentence uniformity,"15 (i.e., uniformity "within clauses"'). While Professor Prakash recognizes that a word or phrase, in two or more different contexts
within a document, may have different meanings, "[a]bsent some very
strong reason to the contrary, [Professor Prakash would] conclude that a
word or phrase in a particular clause or sentence has the same meaning
throughout the clause or sentence."5 4 Professor Prakash describes this
as an "appealing and intuitive" norm.155 This narrower form of the uniformity canon indicates that the ideal of uniform meaning appeals to
textualists, even if textualists do not always agree with the scope of its
application.
Textualists, then, often assume that no matter how many times a
word may be used in the Constitution, that word has only one meaning. 5 6 As with the other two canons, concluding that a plain language
149. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal
Courts, 87 CALL. REv. 1409 (1999).
150. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, InterjurisdictionalEnforcement of Rights in a PostErie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1416 n.56 (2005); James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional CriminalProcedure:Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?,
55 MD.L.REV. 223, 245 (1996).
151. David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29
N. KY. L. REV. 827, 851 (2002).
152. Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumptionof Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1149, 1150 (2003).
153. See Vermeule, supra note 122, at 1179.
154. Prakash, supra note 152, at 1150. Professor Prakash does not really state that
"he would" embrace intrasentence uniformity (although he does so in his article). Instead, Professor Prakash states that "we should" make that embrace. Presumably, "we
should" (make that embrace) because he does.
155. Id. at 1149. Professor Vermeule finds this norm neither intuitive nor appealing.
See Vermeule, supra note 122, at 1178. Professor Vermeule is also at a loss as to why
intrasentence uniformity should have more value than "uniformity of usage across clauses." Id. at 1179-80.
156. However, not all who study law agree. As one commentator put it, "[wlhether
the exact same language should be given the same meaning is a matter of intense debate."
Diehm, supra note 150, at 245 n.11 4 . See, e.g., Erik Luna, The .22 CaliberRorschach Test,
39 Hous. L. REV. 53, 108 (2002) ("The Framers were fallible humans who could very well
have had different meanings for the same words in different textual locations."); Thomas
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textualist would (or perhaps should) be bound by the consistent meaning canon has some unfairness, because those who claim plain meaning
of a word often have no need to look to other provisions of a text with
the same word.' Consequently, a plain language textualist may not speOn the other hand, when an interpreter
cifically embrace the canon.'
of the Constitution declares that one word or phrase has a plain meaning
- a meaning that apparently is not impacted by its context - concluding
that such an interpreter should be bound by that same plain meaning,
when that word or phrase is used elsewhere, seems justified.'
Returning to the Takings Clause, as noted before,' 6 0 a number of
scholars have suggested that the Takings Clause has a plain meaning.'6
In so doing, these scholars often discuss the idea that the word "take" has
a plain meaning that does not include the idea or term "over-regulate." 62
As put by Professor Tunick, "The plain meaning of 'do not take property'
is not 'do not regulate unfairly' . . . ."163 These scholars often discuss the
W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REv. 885, 956 (2000)
("[T]here is precedent for adopting different meanings of the same word for purposes of
different clauses of the Constitution."); Golove, supra note 98, at 1909 n.360 ("Chief Justice Marshall noted that in construing the Constitution 'the same words have not necessarily the same meaning attached to them, when found in different parts of the same instrument their meaning is controlled by the context."' (quoting Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 19 (1831))).
157. Arguably such a search is inconsistent with a plain meaning. A person who declares a word to have a plain meaning need not look to other provisions of the same document to "prove" what is already plain.
158. Daniel J. Oates, Comment, HIPPA Hypocrisy And The Case For Enforcing Federal
Privacy Standards Under State Law, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 745, 758 (2007) (noting that it
would be "absurd" to conclude that "Congress intended a plain word ... to have two
completely different definitions in the span of a few intervening words").
159. This conclusion seems, to the author, to follow from the meaning of plain language textualism - that a word or phrase has one meaning. It does not seem possible that
a word or phrase with more than one meaning could have "a" (as in "a single") plain
meaning. Of course, it could be argued that a word has a "plain meaning" in context.
However, that argument would create more discussion as to what contexts are relevant from context within a document to context within history - and that path leads away
from a plain meaning.
160. See discussion supra Part II.
161. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 10, at 876.
162. See, e.g., Span, supra note 10, at 96 n.373.
163. Mark Tunick, Constitutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 886 & n.10 (2001); see also
Echeverria, supra note 10, at 860-61 & n.66 (noting that "[j jurists and academics of virtually all ideological persuasions recognize that the Takings Clause was originally intended to address only direct appropriations of private property"). Professor Echeverria
"borrow[s] Dean Bill Treanor's metaphor to explain the Takings Clause's plain meaning.
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plain meaning of "take," but avoid any discussion of the meaning of
"property.""
Some assert that "take" means "physical appropriation[],"' 6 5 or to "grasp, seize, [or] lay hold of."' 66 While others state that
"[tlo take property connotes to seize, expropriate, or confiscate some
thing, that is, a discrete asset."167 in other words, in order to be "taken"
there must be a "thing, that is, a discrete asset."'" This approach effectively uses the word "take" to define the meaning of "property."169
...
John D. Echeverria, From a "DarklingPlain" to What?: The Regulatory Takings Issue
in U.S. Law and Policy, 30 VT. L. REV. 969, 975 (2006). Treanor likens property to a noisy, bouncing ball. Id. According to the metaphor, if the ball is removed from the "owner" (a child) it has been taken. Id. If the child is told not to bounce it, the use has been
regulated and the ball was not taken. Id. This metaphor implicitly suggests that all
property has a physical shape that can be held and controlled. This is certainly not the
only possible meaning for property. Just as important, the metaphor ignores the fact that
the possessor of the noisy, bouncy ball (the child) purchased (or at least "owned") a noisy, bouncy sphere, and not a spherical stone of the same size. If the "regulator" had sold
the bouncy round sphere, it likely would have sold it for the inherent value of a noisily
bouncing ball. If the ball did not noisily bounce, the sale would have been a fraud. If the
seller later makes it illegal to noisily bounce the ball, the sale might as well have been a
fraud. Certainly, the typical child who possesses the noisy, bouncy ball cannot really distinguish between, "thou shalt not possess the ball" and "thou shalt not bounce the ball."
To the child, the result is the same: the ball might as well have been taken. Presumably
Dean Treanor (as the parent) would ask the child to find value in the act of silently possessing (holding) the orb. Dean Treanor suggests by his analogy that the parent (the
regulator) has not "taken" the ball because he does not possess the ball. Perhaps this is
one insight into the "plain meaning" of the Takings Clause. From the perspective of the
parent, no possession (by the parent) means no taking (by the parent). From the perspective of the child, the ONLY purpose of the ball was to noisily bounce it. Thus, no
noisy bouncing equates to a taking of the noise, the bounce, the fun, and to the child, the
ball. From the perspective of the child, why pay a dollar to purchase the orb if the only
use is to look at it?
164. See, e.g., David A. Thomas, Finding More Piecesfor the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLo. L. REv. 497, 541 (2004); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due
Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 770-71 & n.245 (2002); Tunick,
supra note 163, at 900 & nn.47, 61; Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings
Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L.
REV. 509, 524 (1998). But see Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 96 n.373 (2003).
165. See Thomas, supra note 164, at 541; accord Hart, supra note 10, at 1134; Echeverria, supra note 10, at 860.
166. Tunick, supra note 163, at 886.
167. Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 679, 708 (2008) (quoting Merrill, supra note 156, at 983-84).
168. Merrill, supra note 156, at 983-84.
169. One acceptable method of determining the meaning of a word includes looking
at other words in the same sentence. Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary, with seven-
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Professor Thomas Merrill expressly and openly uses this approach
to distinguish between the meaning of the word "property" in the Takings Clause and in the Due Process Clause.'70 Professor Merrill does not
purport to be a plain language textualist, but he does demonstrate that
the different words surrounding "property" in the two clauses impact the
meaning of "property."' 7' Professor Merrill openly engages in "contextualism," expressly using the word "take" to define the word "property."l 72 He notes that the Fifth Amendment uses both "take" and "deprived" in relation to "property."17 ' He argues, reasonably, that using
"take" and "deprived" suggest that "property" has different meanings due
to different contexts and that one word helps to define the other. 7 4
teen pages of definitions and examples for understanding the word "take," states that
"take" "is one of the elemental words of the language, of which the only direct explanation is to show the thing or action to which they are applied." Durden, supra note 4, at
382 (internal citations omitted). Perceiving the meaning of words using sentence context may be appropriate for a contextualist, see Kent Greenawait, Propter Honoris Respecturn: The Nature of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1466
(1997) ("A contextualist maintains that the meaning of any word or sentence cannot be
determined apart from context."); see also Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful
Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 515, 524 n.43 (1997), but seems out of place for a plain
See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in
language textualist.
Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1023 (1988) (discussing the distinction between
contextual interpretation and plain meaning textualism); see also Juliet P. Kostritsky,
Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages: A FunctionalSolution to the Opportunism Problem,
39 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2006) (discussing why contextual interpretation rather than
insistence on plain meaning will often reduce moral hazard in the negotiation of
contracts). Notwithstanding the very strong likelihood that using the word "take" to
define "property" suggests an interpretational method inconsistent with plain meaning
textualism, this Article posits that the plain language textualist properly limits the
meaning of "property" to "things" and "title."
170. Merrill, supra note 156, at 983-84 ("[T]he contrast between 'take' and 'deprive'
may support the conclusion that the Due Process Clause is concerned with property in a
broader sense that includes the protection of wealth against government-imposed liabilities as well as the protection of things from expropriation."). This note is not intended to
suggest that Professor Merrill is a textualist. Instead, this note intends to show that some
expressly use the word "take" to define "property," while textualists may do so only sub
silentio. Professor Andrew Gold seems to use the opposite approach. Gold looks at the
meaning of the word "property" to help determine the meaning of the word "take." Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 589-90 (2003). As Professor Gold suggests, the word "taken" does not determine the meaning of the word "property," but rather, "property"
determines the meaning of the word "taken." See id. at 579-80 & nn.53-54.
171. Merrill, supra note 156, at 983-84.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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However, a plain language textualist interpretation of the Takings Clause
would follow Professor Merrill's path in the other direction, declaring
that "take" has a plain meaning, and then using that meaning (that context) to define "property," if only implicitly.
Dean Treanor, no advocate of textualism, 7 5 once argued, based on
his use of evidence, that "the original understanding of the Takings
Clause ... was consistent with what [he] hals] argued is the clauses'
[sic] plain meaning." 7 6 More recently, Dean Treanor extensively discussed the meaning of "take" as set forth in the Oxford English Dictionary and late eighteenth century dictionaries, concluding that he could
not find "a usage of take consistent with diminution of a right."17 Dean
Treanor makes this conclusion in an article that begins with a discussion
of the multitude of meanings assigned to the word "property."" 8 Notwithstanding the start of the article, Dean Treanor focuses solely on the
meaning of "take" to support his understanding of the Takings Clause.
Those who proclaim a plain meaning to the Takings Clause consistently
use this approach, searching for or declaring a meaning of "take," and
then using that meaning to define both the Takings Clause and, effectively, "property."" 9 This approach suggests, without clearly stating
such, that "property" in the Takings Clause refers to that which has a
physical existence or fee simple absolute (subject to eminent domain). 80
Admittedly, a person declaring a plain meaning of the Takings Clause
based on the plain meaning of "take" or "taken" may not expressly state a
definition of "property," but that definition can, and necessarily must, be
inferred. The plain language textualist can easily declare that a regulation neither takes possession nor title and therefore is not a compensable
taking under the Takings Clause.'"' In the end, that declaration works
175. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, OriginalMeaning, and the Case of Amar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 487 (2007).
176. William Michael Treanor, Takings Law and the Regulatory State: A Response to
R.S. Radford, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 453, 457 (1995).
177. William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 633, 639 (2008). It is
not clear whether Dean Treanor still embraces the idea that the Takings Clause has a
plain meaning or whether some (or all) aspects of regulatory takings jurisprudence must
be rejected.
178. Id. at 633.
179. As noted before, Professor Merrill openly takes this approach. Merrill, supra
note 156, at 983-84.
180. One of the multitudes of questions raised by this approach concerns the implicit
conclusion that the plain meaning of "take" should provide the definition of property.
181. See, e.g., Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 524
(1998); see also Mark Tunick, ConstitutionalProtectionsof Private Property:Decouplingthe
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only if "property" is a physical thing or at least something to which title
can attach and be passed or condemned.
As with so many constitutional interpreters, the plain meaning textualist now seeks to walk away from the Constitution without any concern as to how the plain meaning interpretation fits into the rest of the
Constitution. Because the textualist has declared that the Takings
Clause has a plain meaning, the textualist need not confront the possibility that the drafters of the Constitution might have used two words, "deprived" and "taken," to mean essentially the same thing. More importantly, the textualist does not have to deal with the reality of looking at
the meaning of the word "property," particularly since its meaning within the Due Process Clauses is very different from that required when the
Takings Clause has a plain meaning.'
For the plain meaning textualist who follows the canon of consistent meaning, if a word has a plain meaning within the Takings Clause,
it must have that same plain meaning when used within other clauses of
the Constitution. This should be particularly true with regard to the
Fifth Amendment. Undeniably, the Takings Clause and the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain different
words, but they also contain one word in common, "property." Ultimately, the question raised here concerns the application of plain language textualism. Those who have argued for a plain language underTakings and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 886 (2001) ("The plain meaning of 'do not take property' is not 'do not regulate unfairly' .... ). Another question not
often discussed by plain language textualists concerns the concept of property being akin
to a bundle of rights. But see Tunick, supra, at 893-97. Professor Tunick, as an exception, asks, "[Hiow many sticks in this bundle must be relinquished for a regulation to
amount to a taking1?]" Id. at 897. The other question might be, why doesn't a taking
occur when one stick is taken? In the end, Kendall and Lord, as well as Professor Tunick, approach the regulatory takings problem the same way - if fee simple absolute is
not completely destroyed (as opposed to only some sticks being taken or a mere diminution in value), there is no taking. Interestingly, their plain meaning approach would find
a compensable taking if the government took title to, or possession of, an easement, but
no compensable taking if the government destroyed the easement, because such destruction is only one of many sticks (a mere diminution in value of the fee simple). See
Treanor, supra note 168, at 639 ("[A] government regulation that diminish[es] the value
of property [does] not take that property."). For a discussion of applying the Takings
Clause to each stick, see, e.g., Kristine Tardiff, Analyzing Every Stick in the Bundle: Why
Examination of a Claimant's Property Interest is the Most Important Inquiry in Every Fifth
Amendment Takings Case, 54 FED. LAWYER 30, passim (2007).
182. The plain meaning approach to the Takings Clause might permit the interpreter
to square the meaning of the Takings Clause with the accepted meanings of the Due
Process Clauses, but the current meaning of property in one of the two Clauses would
need to change.
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standing of the Takings Clause have not made significant reference to
due process "property" when providing a plain language understanding
of takings "property." Given that due process "property" is not limited to
physical things or title, the question remains, why limit takings "property" to physical things or title? In particular, if the government must provide Due Process Clause procedures before "depriving" a person of his or
her "property," must it also provide compensation when it takes that
same "property"? Going further, would the plain language of the Constitution require or permit different meanings of the same word, particularly if the Constitution is to be interpreted via its plain language? It may
be that there are reasons why due process "property" and takings "property" should be considered differently, but those reasons cannot possibly
be based on the plain language of the Constitution.
V.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TEXTUALIST CANONS

By declaring that a word or phrase has plain meaning, the declarant
obviously refers to an (as opposed to the) "obvious meaning," rather than
simply referring to the "simple meaning" of the word or phrase. Such a
declarant rarely states the purpose or jurisprudential meaning behind
choosing a plain meaning approach to interpretation. This plain meaning declarant does not usually discuss whether all words in the Constitution should be interpreted with a plain meaning approach, and perhaps,
never discusses which canons of construction are consistent with taking
a plain meaning approach. Consequently, it may not be fair to hold a
plain meaning declarant to any particular canon of construction.
That said, this Article demonstrates that at least three canons of
construction are consistent with plain meaning interpretation. These
three canons are arguably required if a person claims to rely on this approach, which completely rejects any form of context or other principle
of interpretation. Indeed, many textualists ascribe to these three canons.
However, these three canons, when used in conjunction with the
plain meaning of the Takings Clause, create interpretational conundrums. A person cannot rely on both the plain meaning of the Takings
Clause and the three textualist canons discussed. The interpreter must
claim plain meaning and reject other plain meanings, or at least reject
meanings that would exist with application of the textualist canons. But,
the choice of when to declare plain meaning and reject a plain meaning
canon of construction is not found within the text of the Constitution.
One conclusion follows, that textualists who proclaim adherence to rules
have no principles to rely upon when interpreting the Constitution. Rather, and perhaps more fairly, the plain language textualist uses unwrit-
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ten, unstated and undeniably personal principles and standards to decide
when and whether to apply a plain meaning canon - a canon consistent
with, and arguably demanded by, a belief that words and phrases in the
Constitution should be given and have plain meanings.
In the end, the plain meaning textualist can cry "foul," asserting that
it is one thing to apply plain meaning to words and phrases, and quite
another to apply controversial canons of construction. Ultimately, this
discussion merely suggests that a plain meaning interpretation of the
Takings Clause conflicts with an application of the three canons of construction closely allied with the principles of plain meaning textualism.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article reviewed three textualist canons of construction, in
light of a plain meaning interpretation of the Takings Clause, to demonstrate the ultimate failure of each canon. To recap, plain language textualists assert a plain or obvious meaning to a word or words. The three
canons chosen necessarily follow from the obviousness of words or their
obvious non-existence. Using these canons creates an interpretational
conundrum that a plain language textualist cannot solve using any form
of plain meaning textualism. The text alone cannot explain how the two
Due Process Clauses, with the exact same language, have vastly different
meanings; nor can the text alone be used to explain why the use of the
word "property" in the same constitutional amendment has two different
meanings; nor can textualism explain how an amendment, whose words
exclude the Takings Clause but include the Due Process Clause, still includes the Takings Clause. Ultimately, this Article does not assert that
textualism and canons of construction cannot or should not be used to
interpret the Constitution. Instead, this Article demonstrates that the
purportedly facile interpretational methodology known as plain meaning
textualism creates a facade of objectivity, concealing subjective predilections of the interpreter.
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